In this paper we seek to compare the configurations and quality of passenger aircraft resulting from the use of different design methodologies. First, we will optimize the design in the traditional iterative framework that is generally followed in practice. To this we will compare the results obtained following a design methodology based in part on game theoretic principles. We will compare not only the quality of the resulting designs, but also the efficiency of the design process in terms of time and cost.
Introduction
In the design of a complex engineering system, many separate design teams may contribute to the final overall design. In a large project, such as the design of an aircraft or automobile, there may be many such teams, each responsible for a single component or subsystem. In a Concurrent Engineering (CE) environment, cooperation and communication between the design teams is essential for maximizing both the quality of the final design and the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the design process. Although there have been significant improvements in recent years owing to the introduction of CE principles, full cooperation between design teams still does not always occur. This less than complete cooperation may result from organizational barriers or geographical remoteness that make communication and collaboration difficult or even impossible.
Often, the subsystems in such a system are coupled (i.e. the design of one subsystem requires design information from other subsystems). Traditionally, the approach to handling the coupling has been to guess at values for the needed design information and then iterate between the coupled subsystems until a design point is reached that is satisfactory to all of the designers. The sequential nature of this type of design methodology makes it both costly and time consuming and often does not lead to the optimal solution. Clearly a new approach is needed which takes into account the complex interactions present among the designers.
Some recent efforts have focused on reducing or suspending the coupling between the subsystems. One way is to optimally order the subsystems such that the dependencies are minimized and the amount of iteration necessary for convergence is reduced. 1 Another method allows couplings between subsystems to be temporarily suspended, which also acts to speed convergence. 2 Although these methods are very successful in improving design process efficiency, they do not attempt to explicitly describe the interaction of one subsystem with the subsystems to which it is coupled. In addition, the effect more or less cooperation between the designers has on the final solution is not considered.
In the following sections we will introduce both the iterative and game theoretic approaches to design. The game theoretic approach inherently takes into account the interactions among designers and uses this information to improve both product and process quality. First, we will provide a brief overview of game theory and describe its utility in describing the complex interactions among designers. Following this we will describe the traditional sequential design methodology and introduce the suggested game theoretic approach. Finally, we will consider the design of a passenger aircraft as a test bed to compare the two approaches and illustrate the usefulness of our approach.
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Background
In this section we will introduce game theory, the primary foundation for this work, along with Response Surface Methodology (RSM) and Design of Experiments (DOE) which will be crucial to the implementation of the game theoretic design methodology.
Game Theory
Game theory is set of mathematical constructs that describe the interaction between multiple decisionmakers. Although long a mainstay in the fields of economics and the behavioral sciences, it can be a powerful aid in the design process particularly when there is interaction between multiple designers, design teams, or companies. 3 Three game theoretic protocols have been developed to describe the interactions that occur among designers within a complex design process. 4 To avoid confusion it should be noted that in this context the term player (used extensively in game theory literature) is equivalent to designer or design team.
In the best case scenario, cooperation exists among the designers.
Each designer has an exact representation of the information needed from the other designers. This type of decision-making environment leads to the highest quality solution and affords the designers with large amounts of design freedom. 5 Unfortunately, in practice perfect cooperation seldom occurs in the design of a large engineering system due to the complex interactions taking place both within and between design teams.
By contrast, the worst case scenario corresponds to a situation when designers are isolated. They act independently of one another without any exchange of information. This design information deficit, necessitates a 'design for worst case' strategy where each team assumes the most unfavorable values for the needed design variables. 6 As might be expected intuitively, noncooperation generally leads to a poor design and should be avoided. 7 Between the two extremes of cooperative and isolated design environments is where most actual design processes lie. Designers share information when possible and make guesses when necessary. Also, the decisions made are often not completely concurrent in nature but occur sequentially. This may be due to long-standing practices within a company of one disciplinary team designing their subsystem first and passing this information on the second designer and so on. For instance in the design of a turbine engine, the design could start at the compressor subsystem, proceed to the combustor subsystem, and then be passed to the turbine subsystem. As the design process progresses each subsystem becomes increasingly constrained by the design decisions made by the preceding subsystems. However, since they have information regarding the previous design stages there is also a reduction in the level of uncertainty as the design moves towards completion.
Mathematically, the sequential or leader/follower design protocol can be expressed as a multi-level programming problem. For the sake of simplicity only the two-player case is considered. Player 1 (leader) has freedom to select values for the vector of design variables X 1 . Player 2 (follower) has control over the vector of design variables X 2 . The problem from the standpoint of player 1 (leader) can be expressed as: where the last equation implies that X 2 is part of the Rational Reaction Set (RRS) of the follower, player 2. The Rational Reaction Set is a function that embodies the reaction of one player to decisions made by other players. As given by its name, it assumes that a player will act rationally. Therefore, in the formulation (1), the leader assumes that the follower will behave rationally, and this behavior is quantified in the leader's RRS. The specific form of the RRS in this case is
and the general form of the RRS is given by:
where x local is the vector of design variables in a single subsystem and x nonlocal are the design variables in the remainder of the system. Equation (2) In other words, the follower now knows X 1 with certainty, but is constrained by it as well.
As the RRS is a function of one independent design variable in terms of other independent design variables, these functions are generally difficult or impossible to determine analytically. In the next section we will describe a method to approximate the RRS using Response Surface Methodology (RSM) and Design of Experiments (DOE).
Using RSM to Approximate the Rational Reaction Set
We have seen in the previous section the importance of the RRS for the solution of the sequential design protocol and the difficulty in determining it analytically. We have therefore chosen to use DOE and RSM to approximate these functions. A conceptual outline for the construction of the Rational Reaction Sets is illustrated in Figure 1 . To approximate the Rational Reaction Set for Player 2 in the above two-player sequential design problem the following procedure is carried out. First, different points are sampled in the leader's (Player 1 in this case) nonlinear design space according to a specific DOE protocol (e.g., central composite design, full factorial, and partial factorial). 8 At each specified point in the design space, the follower's (player 2) model is solved. Once these steps are completed, a second order (or higher) Response Surface is fitted to relate X 1 to X 2 in the form of equation (2) . In this work, this process was automated using existing DOE/RSM and optimization software packages.
OPTIMIZATION
When making these approximations it must not be overlooked that by creating a more tractable problem from the computational standpoint, we are eliminating the higher order nonlinearities that may contain the same robust solution points that we are attempting to utilize or that might result in large discrepancies between predicted and actual behavior. Thus, the designer must make a tradeoff between ease of computation and accuracy of the approximation.
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With the notions of Game Theory and the approximation of the Rational Reaction Set introduced we now undertake the problem of applying these techniques to an actual design problem. In the following section we will first introduce the traditional sequential approach to design and then a formulation based on game theory.
Comparison of Design Methodologies
Traditional Iterative/Sequential Design Figure 2 below can be used to illustrate a typical sequential design process for a coupled, complex engineering system. 9 The system is decomposed into subsystems, generally, along disciplinary lines. Each subsystem has its own goals and constraints that must be satisfied, and has control over a subset of the design variables that describe the overall system. The design process begins with subsystem 1 and proceeds to subsystem 4. If information is passed from one subsystem to another subsystem farther along in the design process it is termed a feedforward. Conversely, if information is passed from a subsystem to another subsystem earlier in the design process, it is termed a feedback. The coupling among the subsystems is thus represented by the feedforwards and feedbacks indicated in the diagram. The fundamental inefficiencies of this approach are illustrated by considering points a and b in the diagram. Point a represents the passing of information from subsystem 1 to subsystem 4, and point b represents the passing of information from subsystem 4 to subsystem 1. Thus, subsystem 1 influences the design of subsystem 1 and subsystem 4 influences the design of subsystem 1. Therefore, the design process must iterate between these subsystems until an acceptable solution is found for both. In addition, during each of these cycles, the design process may also iterate between subsystems 2 and 3 (represented by points c and d in the diagram). It can be seen that with coupling present, the design may iterate between each of the subsystems many times before convergence is achieved (i.e. a solution is found that satisfies all of the subsystems' goals and constraints). Keeping in mind that each iteration is costly in terms of time and money, it is clear that for a large system with many interactions this approach is not very efficient. To overcome this difficulty it is necessary either to reduce the amount of coupling (e.g. the number of iterative loops) or to quantify the dependencies among the subsystems in some way. The game theoretic approach described below focuses on the latter.
Game Theoretic Approach
As described in section 2.1, game theory is fundamentally a tool to describe and quantify the interactions between multiple decisionmakers. As such, we use the compromise Decision Support Problem (DSP) to model a design decision. 10 The Given An alternative to be improved through modification. Assumptions used to model the domain of interest.
Find
Design variables Deviation variables, d
Satisfy
System constraints (linear, nonlinear) System goals (linear, nonlinear) general form of the compromise DSP is given in Figure 3 and includes concepts from mathematical and goal programming. Its form allows us to quite easily incorporate the concepts from game theory into our design approach. The objective is to minimize the deviations from the target goal values established by the designer. These deviations are combined into a deviation function using an Archimedean or Preemptive formulation of deviation variables. This formulation will be used throughout this paper to model the disciplinary design decisions. Each subsystem forms a separate compromise DSP including their specific goals and constraints. Game theory provides us with a way to model the interfaces between these independently controlled subsystems.
Figure 4: Coupled Decision Support Problems
To better illustrate this, consider the case where there are two interacting subsystems (players). The basic form of a two-player problem can be expressed in terms of two coupled Decision Support Problems as shown in Figure 4 . Player 1 (P1) has control over the vector of design variables x 1 in subsystem 1 while Player 2 (P2) controls the vector of design variables x 2 in subsystem 2. Due to the coupling in the subsystems, a portion of the total number of design variables in each subsystem is needed by the other subsystem. Thus, the two vectors, x 1 and x 2 , can be subdivided into the coupled and uncoupled parts. We define (x C1 , x NC1 ) and (x C2 ,x NC2 ) as the coupled and uncoupled portions of x 1 and x 2 respectively. Thus, the goals and constraints for P1 are functions of (x 1 , x C2 ) while the goals and constraints for P2 are a function of (x 2 , x C1 ).
The performance goals consist of subsystem dependent goals (e.g. minimize total weight, cost, etc.). The assumption is made that the Rational Reaction sets of P1 and P2 are known. However, although some information must indeed be passed from one designer to another, the amount is directly dependent on the amount of coupling between the two subsystems, as only the Rational Reaction Sets for the design variable vectors x C1 and x C2 must be formulated. This vector could contain only a small fraction of the total number of design variables for that subsystem.
Comparison of Iterative and Game Theoretic Approaches to Design
The fundamental difference between the traditional iterative/sequential approach to design and the game theoretic approach lies in the way that the unknown coupling variables are represented.
In the iterative/sequential approach, player 1 makes an initial guess for the unknown design variables x c2 . The first player solves their problem using this . 6 initial guess with the output being x c1 and x nc1 . This output is then passed to player 2 who solves the DSP for subsystem 2. No guess is needed, because the coupled design variables that player 2 requires from player 1 have already been determined. The outputs of player 2's problem are the vectors x c2 and x nc2 that are passed back to Player 1 and are used to update the initial guesses for x c2 . This process continues until the design vectors for players 1 and 2 converge to some final values.
In contrast to this is the game theoretic approach that we are proposing. Here, once the Rational Reaction Sets have been determined and passed from the follower to the leader, each player only has to solve their subsystem problem once. Since the RRS embodies the dependencies between the two subsystems, it is not necessary to iterate between them. The drawback is that, in the game theoretic approach there is a need for a pre-processing stage where the Rational Reaction sets for the players are determined.
Although, this may involve considerable effort, the benefit is that there is no need for iteration during the optimization process. The values of the deviation variables associated with the goals
Satisfy
The system constraints The aspect ratio must be less than 10. 
Find
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The values of the deviation variables associated with the goals
Satisfy
The system constraints The useful load must be less than 0. 
Design of a Passenger Aircraft
To illustrate the usefulness of the approach we will consider the design of a passenger aircraft previously considered [3] in other studies. The system is subdivided into two subsystems, an aerodynamics player and a weight player. The Decision Support Problems for each are in Figure 5 . It can be seen that there are a total of 5 total design variables, 3 controlled by Player Aero (X aero : Wing Area -S, Fuselage Length -l, Wing Span -b), and 2 controlled by Player Weight (X weight : Take-off Weight -Wto, Installed Thrust -Ti). Player Aero needs both Wto and Ti from the Weight player, but Player Weight only needs S from the Aero player. In the next sections, we investigate 2 cases for each of the design methodologies (sequential/iterative and game theoretic) described previously. First, we consider the results when Player Aero acts as leader and then when Player Weight act as leader. We compare these two cases and make some observations about the system in general and the . 7 significance of design process structure on the quality of the final solution.
In addition to comparing the final designs in terms of quality, we would like to compare the relative efficiencies of the design processes resulting from the use of the iterative/sequential and game theoretic design methodologies. We propose the following as performance metrics for quantifying the efficiency of the design process.
Performance Metric 1: Number of Subsystem Solutions Necessary
The first performance metric considered will be the total number of times the Decision Support Problem must be solved to reach the final solution to the problem.
For the sequential/iterative design approach this value will be calculated as follows.
# of DSP solutions = (number of aero solutions) + (number of weight solutions)
Since, by using the game theoretic approach we have embodied the interaction between the subsystems in the Rational Reaction Set, we only have to solve the aerodynamics and weight players DSPs once during the formal optimization process. However, in the determination of the RRS it was necessary to solve the DSP a fixed number of times (based on the number of coupling variables and the order of the approximation). Therefore, performance metric 1 will be defined for the game theoretic approach as follows. 
Performance Metric 2: # of information transfers necessary
Since the designers involved in the design of a complex engineering system may not be collocated, information exchange between the subsystems may not be trivial matter.
Consider first sequential/iterative design.
The values of the coupled design variables must be passed between the subsystems during each iteration. For the two subsystem case we are considering, this amounts to only a few variables. In a real system, however, consisting of dozens of interacting subsystems and hundreds of design variables, it is easy to imagine that there would have to exist an infrastructure of some kind to facilitate this kind of communication.
Compare this to the game theoretic approach. Here there is the need for only a single information exchange, namely, the passing of the Rational Reaction Sets from one subsystem to another. This occurs at the beginning of the design process, and after this each subsystem can solve their DSP independently. Clearly, much less infrastructure would be necessary to support this small amount of communication. Thus, performance metric 2 is defined as the number of times information must be transferred between Player Aero and Player Weight. The total design process efficiency can be calculated as the weighted sum of performance metric 1 and performance metric 2 as follows.
Design Process Efficiency = W 1 (Performance Metric 1) + W 2 (Performance Metric 2)
As noted in section 3.3 the comparison of the sequential/iterative and the game theoretic approaches involves a tradeoff between the time and resources required for iteration (in the sequential/iterative approach) and that required for pre-processing to calculate the Rational Reaction set (in the game theoretic approach).
Results from the Iterative/Sequential Approach
In this section we will look at the results from the traditional iterative/sequential approach. The results are broken up into two parts, namely, Player Aero as Leader, and Player Weight as Leader. Table 1 , on the following page, summarizes the results for the case when Player Aero is leader and Player Weight is follower. As can be seen, after 9 iterations the design variables and the objective functions for both players have settled down to near constant values. Thus, a total of 18 optimizations were completed in order to solve this problem. The convergence history for the objective functions is plotted below in Figure 7 .
Design Scenario 1: Player Aero as Leader
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Evaluating the Results
Having presented the results for both the iterative/sequential and game theoretic approaches we would like to evaluate them using the performance metrics proposed previously. Table 4 summarizes these results. The use of the game theoretic approach requires a relatively large amount of subsystem solutions, but only a single information transfer, and resulted in a better solution. The iterative/sequential case on the other hand, required a significant amount of both subsystem solutions and information transfers for both design scenarios, although the number of subsystem solutions was considerably less for the Aero as Leader design scenario. * The number of subsystem solutions required for the creation of Rational Reaction Set using the Response Surface approximation (see section 2.2).
Evaluation of Results
Objective
Table 4: Evaluation of Results
It is clear the game theoretic approach yielded some improvement in the quality of the design over the iterative/sequential approach. In terms of design process efficiency, the results depend on how relatively costly a subsystem solution is compared to an information transfer between the two subsystems.
If the cost to support the communication between the subsystems is high, then the game theoretic approach is clearly superior due to the need for only one exchange of information. If, however, the cost of a subsystem solution is high, then the most efficient design approach depends on the complexity of the problem. This is because the number of subsystem solutions required to form the Rational Reaction Set increases with increasing number of design variables. It is our opinion, however, that this drawback is greatly outweighed by the advantage incurred by being able to make one information exchange, and then complete the design independent of the other subsystems with no further communication.
11
Conclusions
We have compared the traditional iterative/sequential approach to design with a design methodology based on game theoretic principles. Preliminary results have shown that the game theoretic approach is superior in cases involving multiple interacting designers because it affords a drastic reduction in the amount of communication necessary. This is accomplished through the creation of the Rational Reaction set, which embodies the interaction between different subsystems.
Future work will include the application of the game theoretic approach to more complex problems involving more than two subsystems. Also, work is underway to reduce the number of subsystem solutions required to form the Rational Reaction Set through the use of neural networks.
